Extract ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio from SelectNodeToEvict

to allow deterministic unit testing of the ratio-based peer eviction protection
logic, which protects peers having longer connection times and those connected
via higher-latency networks.

Add documentation.
pull/826/head
Jon Atack 4 years ago
parent a9d1b40d53
commit f126cbd6de
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4F5721B3D0E3921D

@ -879,6 +879,26 @@ static void EraseLastKElements(std::vector<T> &elements, Comparator comparator,
elements.erase(elements.end() - eraseSize, elements.end()); elements.erase(elements.end() - eraseSize, elements.end());
} }
void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& vEvictionCandidates)
{
// Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest.
// This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later.
// Reserve half of these protected spots for localhost peers, even if
// they're not longest-uptime overall. This helps protect tor peers, which
// tend to be otherwise disadvantaged under our eviction criteria.
size_t initial_size = vEvictionCandidates.size();
size_t total_protect_size = initial_size / 2;
// Pick out up to 1/4 peers that are localhost, sorted by longest uptime.
std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), CompareLocalHostTimeConnected);
size_t local_erase_size = total_protect_size / 2;
vEvictionCandidates.erase(std::remove_if(vEvictionCandidates.end() - local_erase_size, vEvictionCandidates.end(), [](NodeEvictionCandidate const &n) { return n.m_is_local; }), vEvictionCandidates.end());
// Calculate how many we removed, and update our total number of peers that
// we want to protect based on uptime accordingly.
total_protect_size -= initial_size - vEvictionCandidates.size();
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected, total_protect_size);
}
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<NodeId> SelectNodeToEvict(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>&& vEvictionCandidates) [[nodiscard]] std::optional<NodeId> SelectNodeToEvict(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>&& vEvictionCandidates)
{ {
// Protect connections with certain characteristics // Protect connections with certain characteristics
@ -901,22 +921,9 @@ static void EraseLastKElements(std::vector<T> &elements, Comparator comparator,
// An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work. // An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, CompareNodeBlockTime, 4); EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, CompareNodeBlockTime, 4);
// Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest. // Protect some of the remaining eviction candidates by ratios of desirable
// This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later. // or disadvantaged characteristics.
// Reserve half of these protected spots for localhost peers, even if ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(vEvictionCandidates);
// they're not longest-uptime overall. This helps protect tor peers, which
// tend to be otherwise disadvantaged under our eviction criteria.
size_t initial_size = vEvictionCandidates.size();
size_t total_protect_size = initial_size / 2;
// Pick out up to 1/4 peers that are localhost, sorted by longest uptime.
std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), CompareLocalHostTimeConnected);
size_t local_erase_size = total_protect_size / 2;
vEvictionCandidates.erase(std::remove_if(vEvictionCandidates.end() - local_erase_size, vEvictionCandidates.end(), [](NodeEvictionCandidate const &n) { return n.m_is_local; }), vEvictionCandidates.end());
// Calculate how many we removed, and update our total number of peers that
// we want to protect based on uptime accordingly.
total_protect_size -= initial_size - vEvictionCandidates.size();
EraseLastKElements(vEvictionCandidates, ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected, total_protect_size);
if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return std::nullopt; if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return std::nullopt;

@ -1283,6 +1283,32 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate
bool m_is_local; bool m_is_local;
}; };
/**
* Select an inbound peer to evict after filtering out (protecting) peers having
* distinct, difficult-to-forge characteristics. The protection logic picks out
* fixed numbers of desirable peers per various criteria, followed by ratios of
* desirable or disadvantaged peers. If any eviction candidates remain, the
* selection logic chooses a peer to evict.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<NodeId> SelectNodeToEvict(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>&& vEvictionCandidates); [[nodiscard]] std::optional<NodeId> SelectNodeToEvict(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>&& vEvictionCandidates);
/** Protect desirable or disadvantaged inbound peers from eviction by ratio.
*
* This function protects half of the peers which have been connected the
* longest, to replicate the non-eviction implicit behavior and preclude attacks
* that start later.
*
* Half of these protected spots (1/4 of the total) are reserved for localhost
* peers, if any, sorted by longest uptime, even if they're not longest uptime
* overall.
*
* This helps protect onion peers, which tend to be otherwise disadvantaged
* under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times relative to IPv4
* and IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections.
*
* This function was extracted from SelectNodeToEvict() to be able to test the
* ratio-based protection logic deterministically.
*/
void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& vEvictionCandidates);
#endif // BITCOIN_NET_H #endif // BITCOIN_NET_H

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