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553 lines
20 KiB
553 lines
20 KiB
# Copyright (c) 2019-2020 Pieter Wuille
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# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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"""Test-only secp256k1 elliptic curve implementation
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WARNING: This code is slow, uses bad randomness, does not properly protect
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keys, and is trivially vulnerable to side channel attacks. Do not use for
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anything but tests."""
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import csv
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import hashlib
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import os
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import random
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import sys
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import unittest
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from .util import modinv
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def TaggedHash(tag, data):
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ss = hashlib.sha256(tag.encode('utf-8')).digest()
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ss += ss
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ss += data
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return hashlib.sha256(ss).digest()
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def xor_bytes(b0, b1):
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return bytes(x ^ y for (x, y) in zip(b0, b1))
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def jacobi_symbol(n, k):
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"""Compute the Jacobi symbol of n modulo k
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See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobi_symbol
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For our application k is always prime, so this is the same as the Legendre symbol."""
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assert k > 0 and k & 1, "jacobi symbol is only defined for positive odd k"
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n %= k
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t = 0
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while n != 0:
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while n & 1 == 0:
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n >>= 1
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r = k & 7
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t ^= (r == 3 or r == 5)
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n, k = k, n
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t ^= (n & k & 3 == 3)
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n = n % k
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if k == 1:
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return -1 if t else 1
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return 0
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def modsqrt(a, p):
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"""Compute the square root of a modulo p when p % 4 = 3.
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The Tonelli-Shanks algorithm can be used. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonelli-Shanks_algorithm
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Limiting this function to only work for p % 4 = 3 means we don't need to
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iterate through the loop. The highest n such that p - 1 = 2^n Q with Q odd
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is n = 1. Therefore Q = (p-1)/2 and sqrt = a^((Q+1)/2) = a^((p+1)/4)
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secp256k1's is defined over field of size 2**256 - 2**32 - 977, which is 3 mod 4.
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"""
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if p % 4 != 3:
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raise NotImplementedError("modsqrt only implemented for p % 4 = 3")
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sqrt = pow(a, (p + 1)//4, p)
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if pow(sqrt, 2, p) == a % p:
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return sqrt
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return None
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class EllipticCurve:
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def __init__(self, p, a, b):
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"""Initialize elliptic curve y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b over GF(p)."""
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self.p = p
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self.a = a % p
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self.b = b % p
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def affine(self, p1):
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"""Convert a Jacobian point tuple p1 to affine form, or None if at infinity.
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An affine point is represented as the Jacobian (x, y, 1)"""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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if z1 == 0:
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return None
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inv = modinv(z1, self.p)
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inv_2 = (inv**2) % self.p
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inv_3 = (inv_2 * inv) % self.p
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return ((inv_2 * x1) % self.p, (inv_3 * y1) % self.p, 1)
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def has_even_y(self, p1):
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"""Whether the point p1 has an even Y coordinate when expressed in affine coordinates."""
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return not (p1[2] == 0 or self.affine(p1)[1] & 1)
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def negate(self, p1):
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"""Negate a Jacobian point tuple p1."""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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return (x1, (self.p - y1) % self.p, z1)
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def on_curve(self, p1):
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"""Determine whether a Jacobian tuple p is on the curve (and not infinity)"""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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z2 = pow(z1, 2, self.p)
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z4 = pow(z2, 2, self.p)
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return z1 != 0 and (pow(x1, 3, self.p) + self.a * x1 * z4 + self.b * z2 * z4 - pow(y1, 2, self.p)) % self.p == 0
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def is_x_coord(self, x):
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"""Test whether x is a valid X coordinate on the curve."""
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x_3 = pow(x, 3, self.p)
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return jacobi_symbol(x_3 + self.a * x + self.b, self.p) != -1
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def lift_x(self, x):
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"""Given an X coordinate on the curve, return a corresponding affine point for which the Y coordinate is even."""
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x_3 = pow(x, 3, self.p)
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v = x_3 + self.a * x + self.b
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y = modsqrt(v, self.p)
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if y is None:
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return None
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return (x, self.p - y if y & 1 else y, 1)
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def double(self, p1):
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"""Double a Jacobian tuple p1
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See https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography/Prime_Curve/Jacobian_Coordinates - Point Doubling"""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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if z1 == 0:
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return (0, 1, 0)
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y1_2 = (y1**2) % self.p
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y1_4 = (y1_2**2) % self.p
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x1_2 = (x1**2) % self.p
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s = (4*x1*y1_2) % self.p
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m = 3*x1_2
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if self.a:
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m += self.a * pow(z1, 4, self.p)
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m = m % self.p
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x2 = (m**2 - 2*s) % self.p
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y2 = (m*(s - x2) - 8*y1_4) % self.p
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z2 = (2*y1*z1) % self.p
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return (x2, y2, z2)
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def add_mixed(self, p1, p2):
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"""Add a Jacobian tuple p1 and an affine tuple p2
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See https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography/Prime_Curve/Jacobian_Coordinates - Point Addition (with affine point)"""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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x2, y2, z2 = p2
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assert(z2 == 1)
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# Adding to the point at infinity is a no-op
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if z1 == 0:
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return p2
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z1_2 = (z1**2) % self.p
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z1_3 = (z1_2 * z1) % self.p
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u2 = (x2 * z1_2) % self.p
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s2 = (y2 * z1_3) % self.p
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if x1 == u2:
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if (y1 != s2):
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# p1 and p2 are inverses. Return the point at infinity.
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return (0, 1, 0)
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# p1 == p2. The formulas below fail when the two points are equal.
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return self.double(p1)
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h = u2 - x1
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r = s2 - y1
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h_2 = (h**2) % self.p
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h_3 = (h_2 * h) % self.p
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u1_h_2 = (x1 * h_2) % self.p
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x3 = (r**2 - h_3 - 2*u1_h_2) % self.p
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y3 = (r*(u1_h_2 - x3) - y1*h_3) % self.p
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z3 = (h*z1) % self.p
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return (x3, y3, z3)
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def add(self, p1, p2):
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"""Add two Jacobian tuples p1 and p2
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See https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography/Prime_Curve/Jacobian_Coordinates - Point Addition"""
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x1, y1, z1 = p1
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x2, y2, z2 = p2
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# Adding the point at infinity is a no-op
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if z1 == 0:
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return p2
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if z2 == 0:
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return p1
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# Adding an Affine to a Jacobian is more efficient since we save field multiplications and squarings when z = 1
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if z1 == 1:
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return self.add_mixed(p2, p1)
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if z2 == 1:
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return self.add_mixed(p1, p2)
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z1_2 = (z1**2) % self.p
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z1_3 = (z1_2 * z1) % self.p
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z2_2 = (z2**2) % self.p
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z2_3 = (z2_2 * z2) % self.p
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u1 = (x1 * z2_2) % self.p
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u2 = (x2 * z1_2) % self.p
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s1 = (y1 * z2_3) % self.p
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s2 = (y2 * z1_3) % self.p
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if u1 == u2:
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if (s1 != s2):
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# p1 and p2 are inverses. Return the point at infinity.
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return (0, 1, 0)
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# p1 == p2. The formulas below fail when the two points are equal.
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return self.double(p1)
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h = u2 - u1
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r = s2 - s1
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h_2 = (h**2) % self.p
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h_3 = (h_2 * h) % self.p
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u1_h_2 = (u1 * h_2) % self.p
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x3 = (r**2 - h_3 - 2*u1_h_2) % self.p
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y3 = (r*(u1_h_2 - x3) - s1*h_3) % self.p
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z3 = (h*z1*z2) % self.p
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return (x3, y3, z3)
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def mul(self, ps):
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"""Compute a (multi) point multiplication
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ps is a list of (Jacobian tuple, scalar) pairs.
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"""
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r = (0, 1, 0)
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for i in range(255, -1, -1):
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r = self.double(r)
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for (p, n) in ps:
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if ((n >> i) & 1):
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r = self.add(r, p)
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return r
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SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE = 2**256 - 2**32 - 977
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SECP256K1 = EllipticCurve(SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE, 0, 7)
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SECP256K1_G = (0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798, 0x483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8, 1)
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SECP256K1_ORDER = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
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SECP256K1_ORDER_HALF = SECP256K1_ORDER // 2
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class ECPubKey():
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"""A secp256k1 public key"""
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def __init__(self):
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"""Construct an uninitialized public key"""
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self.valid = False
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def set(self, data):
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"""Construct a public key from a serialization in compressed or uncompressed format"""
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if (len(data) == 65 and data[0] == 0x04):
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p = (int.from_bytes(data[1:33], 'big'), int.from_bytes(data[33:65], 'big'), 1)
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self.valid = SECP256K1.on_curve(p)
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if self.valid:
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self.p = p
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self.compressed = False
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elif (len(data) == 33 and (data[0] == 0x02 or data[0] == 0x03)):
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x = int.from_bytes(data[1:33], 'big')
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if SECP256K1.is_x_coord(x):
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p = SECP256K1.lift_x(x)
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# Make the Y coordinate odd if required (lift_x always produces
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# a point with an even Y coordinate).
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if data[0] & 1:
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p = SECP256K1.negate(p)
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self.p = p
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self.valid = True
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self.compressed = True
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else:
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self.valid = False
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else:
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self.valid = False
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@property
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def is_compressed(self):
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return self.compressed
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@property
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def is_valid(self):
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return self.valid
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def get_bytes(self):
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assert(self.valid)
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p = SECP256K1.affine(self.p)
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if p is None:
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return None
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if self.compressed:
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return bytes([0x02 + (p[1] & 1)]) + p[0].to_bytes(32, 'big')
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else:
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return bytes([0x04]) + p[0].to_bytes(32, 'big') + p[1].to_bytes(32, 'big')
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def verify_ecdsa(self, sig, msg, low_s=True):
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"""Verify a strictly DER-encoded ECDSA signature against this pubkey.
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See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm for the
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ECDSA verifier algorithm"""
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assert(self.valid)
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# Extract r and s from the DER formatted signature. Return false for
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# any DER encoding errors.
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if (sig[1] + 2 != len(sig)):
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return False
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if (len(sig) < 4):
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return False
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if (sig[0] != 0x30):
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return False
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if (sig[2] != 0x02):
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return False
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rlen = sig[3]
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if (len(sig) < 6 + rlen):
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return False
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if rlen < 1 or rlen > 33:
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return False
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if sig[4] >= 0x80:
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return False
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if (rlen > 1 and (sig[4] == 0) and not (sig[5] & 0x80)):
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return False
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r = int.from_bytes(sig[4:4+rlen], 'big')
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if (sig[4+rlen] != 0x02):
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return False
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slen = sig[5+rlen]
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if slen < 1 or slen > 33:
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return False
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if (len(sig) != 6 + rlen + slen):
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return False
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if sig[6+rlen] >= 0x80:
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return False
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if (slen > 1 and (sig[6+rlen] == 0) and not (sig[7+rlen] & 0x80)):
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return False
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s = int.from_bytes(sig[6+rlen:6+rlen+slen], 'big')
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# Verify that r and s are within the group order
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if r < 1 or s < 1 or r >= SECP256K1_ORDER or s >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
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return False
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if low_s and s >= SECP256K1_ORDER_HALF:
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return False
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z = int.from_bytes(msg, 'big')
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# Run verifier algorithm on r, s
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w = modinv(s, SECP256K1_ORDER)
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u1 = z*w % SECP256K1_ORDER
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u2 = r*w % SECP256K1_ORDER
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R = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, u1), (self.p, u2)]))
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if R is None or R[0] != r:
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return False
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return True
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def generate_privkey():
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"""Generate a valid random 32-byte private key."""
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return random.randrange(1, SECP256K1_ORDER).to_bytes(32, 'big')
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class ECKey():
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"""A secp256k1 private key"""
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def __init__(self):
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self.valid = False
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def set(self, secret, compressed):
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"""Construct a private key object with given 32-byte secret and compressed flag."""
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assert(len(secret) == 32)
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secret = int.from_bytes(secret, 'big')
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self.valid = (secret > 0 and secret < SECP256K1_ORDER)
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if self.valid:
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self.secret = secret
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self.compressed = compressed
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def generate(self, compressed=True):
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"""Generate a random private key (compressed or uncompressed)."""
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self.set(generate_privkey(), compressed)
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def get_bytes(self):
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"""Retrieve the 32-byte representation of this key."""
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assert(self.valid)
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return self.secret.to_bytes(32, 'big')
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@property
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def is_valid(self):
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return self.valid
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@property
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def is_compressed(self):
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return self.compressed
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def get_pubkey(self):
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"""Compute an ECPubKey object for this secret key."""
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assert(self.valid)
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ret = ECPubKey()
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p = SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, self.secret)])
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ret.p = p
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ret.valid = True
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ret.compressed = self.compressed
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return ret
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def sign_ecdsa(self, msg, low_s=True):
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"""Construct a DER-encoded ECDSA signature with this key.
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See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm for the
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ECDSA signer algorithm."""
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assert(self.valid)
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z = int.from_bytes(msg, 'big')
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# Note: no RFC6979, but a simple random nonce (some tests rely on distinct transactions for the same operation)
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k = random.randrange(1, SECP256K1_ORDER)
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R = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, k)]))
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r = R[0] % SECP256K1_ORDER
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s = (modinv(k, SECP256K1_ORDER) * (z + self.secret * r)) % SECP256K1_ORDER
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if low_s and s > SECP256K1_ORDER_HALF:
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s = SECP256K1_ORDER - s
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# Represent in DER format. The byte representations of r and s have
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# length rounded up (255 bits becomes 32 bytes and 256 bits becomes 33
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# bytes).
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rb = r.to_bytes((r.bit_length() + 8) // 8, 'big')
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sb = s.to_bytes((s.bit_length() + 8) // 8, 'big')
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return b'\x30' + bytes([4 + len(rb) + len(sb), 2, len(rb)]) + rb + bytes([2, len(sb)]) + sb
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def compute_xonly_pubkey(key):
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"""Compute an x-only (32 byte) public key from a (32 byte) private key.
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This also returns whether the resulting public key was negated.
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"""
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assert len(key) == 32
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x = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
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if x == 0 or x >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
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return (None, None)
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P = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, x)]))
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return (P[0].to_bytes(32, 'big'), not SECP256K1.has_even_y(P))
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def tweak_add_privkey(key, tweak):
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"""Tweak a private key (after negating it if needed)."""
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assert len(key) == 32
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assert len(tweak) == 32
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x = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
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if x == 0 or x >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
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return None
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if not SECP256K1.has_even_y(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, x)])):
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x = SECP256K1_ORDER - x
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t = int.from_bytes(tweak, 'big')
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if t >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
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return None
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x = (x + t) % SECP256K1_ORDER
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if x == 0:
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return None
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return x.to_bytes(32, 'big')
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def tweak_add_pubkey(key, tweak):
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"""Tweak a public key and return whether the result had to be negated."""
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assert len(key) == 32
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assert len(tweak) == 32
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x_coord = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
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if x_coord >= SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE:
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return None
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P = SECP256K1.lift_x(x_coord)
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if P is None:
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return None
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t = int.from_bytes(tweak, 'big')
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if t >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
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return None
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Q = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, t), (P, 1)]))
|
|
if Q is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
return (Q[0].to_bytes(32, 'big'), not SECP256K1.has_even_y(Q))
|
|
|
|
def verify_schnorr(key, sig, msg):
|
|
"""Verify a Schnorr signature (see BIP 340).
|
|
|
|
- key is a 32-byte xonly pubkey (computed using compute_xonly_pubkey).
|
|
- sig is a 64-byte Schnorr signature
|
|
- msg is a 32-byte message
|
|
"""
|
|
assert len(key) == 32
|
|
assert len(msg) == 32
|
|
assert len(sig) == 64
|
|
|
|
x_coord = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
|
|
if x_coord == 0 or x_coord >= SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE:
|
|
return False
|
|
P = SECP256K1.lift_x(x_coord)
|
|
if P is None:
|
|
return False
|
|
r = int.from_bytes(sig[0:32], 'big')
|
|
if r >= SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE:
|
|
return False
|
|
s = int.from_bytes(sig[32:64], 'big')
|
|
if s >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
|
|
return False
|
|
e = int.from_bytes(TaggedHash("BIP0340/challenge", sig[0:32] + key + msg), 'big') % SECP256K1_ORDER
|
|
R = SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, s), (P, SECP256K1_ORDER - e)])
|
|
if not SECP256K1.has_even_y(R):
|
|
return False
|
|
if ((r * R[2] * R[2]) % SECP256K1_FIELD_SIZE) != R[0]:
|
|
return False
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def sign_schnorr(key, msg, aux=None, flip_p=False, flip_r=False):
|
|
"""Create a Schnorr signature (see BIP 340)."""
|
|
|
|
if aux is None:
|
|
aux = bytes(32)
|
|
|
|
assert len(key) == 32
|
|
assert len(msg) == 32
|
|
assert len(aux) == 32
|
|
|
|
sec = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
|
|
if sec == 0 or sec >= SECP256K1_ORDER:
|
|
return None
|
|
P = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, sec)]))
|
|
if SECP256K1.has_even_y(P) == flip_p:
|
|
sec = SECP256K1_ORDER - sec
|
|
t = (sec ^ int.from_bytes(TaggedHash("BIP0340/aux", aux), 'big')).to_bytes(32, 'big')
|
|
kp = int.from_bytes(TaggedHash("BIP0340/nonce", t + P[0].to_bytes(32, 'big') + msg), 'big') % SECP256K1_ORDER
|
|
assert kp != 0
|
|
R = SECP256K1.affine(SECP256K1.mul([(SECP256K1_G, kp)]))
|
|
k = kp if SECP256K1.has_even_y(R) != flip_r else SECP256K1_ORDER - kp
|
|
e = int.from_bytes(TaggedHash("BIP0340/challenge", R[0].to_bytes(32, 'big') + P[0].to_bytes(32, 'big') + msg), 'big') % SECP256K1_ORDER
|
|
return R[0].to_bytes(32, 'big') + ((k + e * sec) % SECP256K1_ORDER).to_bytes(32, 'big')
|
|
|
|
class TestFrameworkKey(unittest.TestCase):
|
|
def test_schnorr(self):
|
|
"""Test the Python Schnorr implementation."""
|
|
byte_arrays = [generate_privkey() for _ in range(3)] + [v.to_bytes(32, 'big') for v in [0, SECP256K1_ORDER - 1, SECP256K1_ORDER, 2**256 - 1]]
|
|
keys = {}
|
|
for privkey in byte_arrays: # build array of key/pubkey pairs
|
|
pubkey, _ = compute_xonly_pubkey(privkey)
|
|
if pubkey is not None:
|
|
keys[privkey] = pubkey
|
|
for msg in byte_arrays: # test every combination of message, signing key, verification key
|
|
for sign_privkey, sign_pubkey in keys.items():
|
|
sig = sign_schnorr(sign_privkey, msg)
|
|
for verify_privkey, verify_pubkey in keys.items():
|
|
if verify_privkey == sign_privkey:
|
|
self.assertTrue(verify_schnorr(verify_pubkey, sig, msg))
|
|
sig = list(sig)
|
|
sig[random.randrange(64)] ^= (1 << (random.randrange(8))) # damaging signature should break things
|
|
sig = bytes(sig)
|
|
self.assertFalse(verify_schnorr(verify_pubkey, sig, msg))
|
|
|
|
def test_schnorr_testvectors(self):
|
|
"""Implement the BIP340 test vectors (read from bip340_test_vectors.csv)."""
|
|
num_tests = 0
|
|
with open(os.path.join(sys.path[0], 'test_framework', 'bip340_test_vectors.csv'), newline='', encoding='utf8') as csvfile:
|
|
reader = csv.reader(csvfile)
|
|
next(reader)
|
|
for row in reader:
|
|
(i_str, seckey_hex, pubkey_hex, aux_rand_hex, msg_hex, sig_hex, result_str, comment) = row
|
|
i = int(i_str)
|
|
pubkey = bytes.fromhex(pubkey_hex)
|
|
msg = bytes.fromhex(msg_hex)
|
|
sig = bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)
|
|
result = result_str == 'TRUE'
|
|
if seckey_hex != '':
|
|
seckey = bytes.fromhex(seckey_hex)
|
|
pubkey_actual = compute_xonly_pubkey(seckey)[0]
|
|
self.assertEqual(pubkey.hex(), pubkey_actual.hex(), "BIP340 test vector %i (%s): pubkey mismatch" % (i, comment))
|
|
aux_rand = bytes.fromhex(aux_rand_hex)
|
|
try:
|
|
sig_actual = sign_schnorr(seckey, msg, aux_rand)
|
|
self.assertEqual(sig.hex(), sig_actual.hex(), "BIP340 test vector %i (%s): sig mismatch" % (i, comment))
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
self.fail("BIP340 test vector %i (%s): signing raised exception %s" % (i, comment, e))
|
|
result_actual = verify_schnorr(pubkey, sig, msg)
|
|
if result:
|
|
self.assertEqual(result, result_actual, "BIP340 test vector %i (%s): verification failed" % (i, comment))
|
|
else:
|
|
self.assertEqual(result, result_actual, "BIP340 test vector %i (%s): verification succeeded unexpectedly" % (i, comment))
|
|
num_tests += 1
|
|
self.assertTrue(num_tests >= 15) # expect at least 15 test vectors
|