This disentangles the script validation skipping from checkpoints.
A new option is introduced "assumevalid" which specifies a block whos
ancestors we assume all have valid scriptsigs and so we do not check
them when they are also burried under the best header by two weeks
worth of work.
Unlike checkpoints this has no influence on consensus unless you set
it to a block with an invalid history. Because of this it can be
easily be updated without risk of influencing the network consensus.
This results in a massive IBD speedup.
This approach was independently recommended by Peter Todd and Luke-Jr
since POW based signature skipping (see PR#9180) does not have the
verifiable properties of a specific hash and may create bad incentives.
The downside is that, like checkpoints, the defaults bitrot and older
releases will sync slower. On the plus side users can provide their
own value here, and if they set it to something crazy all that will
happen is more time will be spend validating signatures.
Checkblocks and checklevel are also moved to the hidden debug options:
Especially now that checkblocks has a low default there is little need
to change these settings, and users frequently misunderstand them as
influencing security or IBD speed. By hiding them we offset the
space added by this new option.
This introduces a 'minimum chain work' chainparam which is intended
to be the known amount of work in the chain for the network at the
time of software release. If you don't have this much work, you're
not yet caught up.
This is used instead of the count of blocks test from checkpoints.
This criteria is trivial to keep updated as there is no element of
subjectivity, trust, or position dependence to it. It is also a more
reliable metric of sync status than a block count.
* Minor formatting such as adjusting links
* Move sections of `doc/multiwallet-qt.md` to the source code and delete
the file, as it is outdated
* Fix typo in the release notes
* Amend release process to mention update of BLOCK_CHAIN_SIZE
06f40ef depends: Mention aarch64 as common cross-compile target (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
05f64c9 doc: Mention Linux ARM builds in release notes (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
b7bf037 doc: Mention ARM executables in release process (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Mention ARM executables in the release process documentation
(these were introduced in #8188).
As well as that Linux tarballs have changed name to contain an
architecture tuple, instead of `linux32`/`linux64`.
Also mention that `-debug` files should not be uploaded (these were
introduced in #8167).
Instruct people to "git fetch" so that if this is their 2nd+ gitian build they will have a fresh bitcoin repo.
Instruct people to add all the known pgp keys to their keyring so that gverify will print more useful info.
done automatically.
At some point along the line, fully offline builds were no longer happening
when strictly following the release-process.md instructions.
We should ensure that users who might want to torify or build offline need
to take extra steps to remain offline.
Also, corrections to build process: including gverify examples for new builders.
This is an ideal version of what the release process should look like,
making it more consistent with the OS X process. Some of the changes
described here would need to be made in the descriptors, which is somewhat
beyond what I would feel comfortable doing, not really understanding the signature process in depth.
[skip ci]
Rather than fetching a signature.tar.gz from somewhere on the net, instruct
Gitian to use a signature from a tag in the bitcoin-detached-sigs repository
which corresponds to the tag of the release being built.
This changes detached-sig-apply.sh to take a dirname rather than a tarball as
an argument, though detached-sig-create.sh still outputs a tarball for
convenience.
- Split linux32/linux64 releases
- Split win32/win64 zips
- Post-processing should no longer be required. The deterministic outputs are
ready for consumption.
This is PR #4271, but with the changes to the descriptors, both the names of the
files and the names of the intermediate build artifact archives, removed.
This also closes#3775 if it goes in, because it covers the changes in
that PR.
Upgrade for https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
Just in case - there is no vulnerability that affects ecdsa signing or
verification.
The MITM attack vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) may have some effect on
our usage of SSL/TLS.
As long as payment requests are signed (which is the common case), usage
of the payment protocol should also not be affected.
The TLS usage in RPC may be at risk for MITM attacks. If you have
`-rpcssl` enabled, be sure to update OpenSSL as soon as possible.
A qt installation date snuck into the host utils (lrelease etc)
This doesn't affect the end product, so no dependency version bump.
It also doesn't explain why gavin's and mine build is different
Gregory Maxwell