Fix handling of invalid headers

We only disconnect outbound peers (excluding HB compact block peers and manual
connections) when receiving a CACHED_INVALID header.
pull/764/head
Suhas Daftuar 6 years ago
parent ef54b486d5
commit 6b34bc6b6f

@ -351,7 +351,16 @@ struct CNodeState {
TxDownloadState m_tx_download;
CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn) : address(addrIn), name(addrNameIn) {
//! Whether this peer is an inbound connection
bool m_is_inbound;
//! Whether this peer is a manual connection
bool m_is_manual_connection;
CNodeState(CAddress addrIn, std::string addrNameIn, bool is_inbound, bool is_manual) :
address(addrIn), name(std::move(addrNameIn)), m_is_inbound(is_inbound),
m_is_manual_connection (is_manual)
{
fCurrentlyConnected = false;
nMisbehavior = 0;
fShouldBan = false;
@ -747,7 +756,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::InitializeNode(CNode *pnode) {
NodeId nodeid = pnode->GetId();
{
LOCK(cs_main);
mapNodeState.emplace_hint(mapNodeState.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(addr, std::move(addrName)));
mapNodeState.emplace_hint(mapNodeState.end(), std::piecewise_construct, std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid), std::forward_as_tuple(addr, std::move(addrName), pnode->fInbound, pnode->m_manual_connection));
}
if(!pnode->fInbound)
PushNodeVersion(pnode, connman, GetTime());
@ -994,9 +1003,22 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v
return true;
}
break;
// Handled elsewhere for now
case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID:
break;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid);
if (node_state == nullptr) {
break;
}
// Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
// Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections.
if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound && !node_state->m_is_manual_connection) {
Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
return true;
}
break;
}
case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
@ -1556,7 +1578,7 @@ inline void static SendBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, const BlockTransac
connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, resp));
}
bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool punish_duplicate_invalid)
bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool via_compact_block)
{
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion());
size_t nCount = headers.size();
@ -1619,41 +1641,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
CBlockHeader first_invalid_header;
if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
if (punish_duplicate_invalid && state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID) {
// Goal: don't allow outbound peers to use up our outbound
// connection slots if they are on incompatible chains.
//
// We ask the caller to set punish_invalid appropriately based
// on the peer and the method of header delivery (compact
// blocks are allowed to be invalid in some circumstances,
// under BIP 152).
// Here, we try to detect the narrow situation that we have a
// valid block header (ie it was valid at the time the header
// was received, and hence stored in mapBlockIndex) but know the
// block is invalid, and that a peer has announced that same
// block as being on its active chain.
// Disconnect the peer in such a situation.
//
// Note: if the header that is invalid was not accepted to our
// mapBlockIndex at all, that may also be grounds for
// disconnecting the peer, as the chain they are on is likely
// to be incompatible. However, there is a circumstance where
// that does not hold: if the header's timestamp is more than
// 2 hours ahead of our current time. In that case, the header
// may become valid in the future, and we don't want to
// disconnect a peer merely for serving us one too-far-ahead
// block header, to prevent an attacker from splitting the
// network by mining a block right at the 2 hour boundary.
//
// TODO: update the DoS logic (or, rather, rewrite the
// DoS-interface between validation and net_processing) so that
// the interface is cleaner, and so that we disconnect on all the
// reasons that a peer's headers chain is incompatible
// with ours (eg block->nVersion softforks, MTP violations,
// etc), and not just the duplicate-invalid case.
pfrom->fDisconnect = true;
}
MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header received");
MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received");
return false;
}
}
@ -2781,7 +2769,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
// the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block.
// Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that
// will be detected and the peer will be banned.
return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*punish_duplicate_invalid=*/false);
return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true);
}
if (fBlockReconstructed) {
@ -2924,12 +2912,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
ReadCompactSize(vRecv); // ignore tx count; assume it is 0.
}
// Headers received via a HEADERS message should be valid, and reflect
// the chain the peer is on. If we receive a known-invalid header,
// disconnect the peer if it is using one of our outbound connection
// slots.
bool should_punish = !pfrom->fInbound && !pfrom->m_manual_connection;
return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, should_punish);
return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/false);
}
if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK)

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