10 Commits (b55866969e248cbd912a1c298e3ba375685575dc)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
MarcoFalke	fa488f131f	scripted-diff: Bump copyright headers ... -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- ./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./ -END VERIFY SCRIPT-	5 years ago
MarcoFalke	faae5a9a35	test: Add bad-txns-*-toolarge test cases to invalid_txs	5 years ago
MarcoFalke	aaaaad6ac9	scripted-diff: Bump copyright of files changed in 2019 ... -BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT- ./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./ -END VERIFY SCRIPT-	5 years ago
fanquake	9bf5768dd6	Merge #16885: doc: Update tx-size-small comment with relevant CVE disclosure ... c4b0c08f7c Update tx-size-small comment with relevant CVE disclosure (Gregory Sanders) Pull request description: Code first introduced under https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11423 with essentially no description and no discussion. ACKs for top commit: MarcoFalke: ACK c4b0c08f7c fanquake: ACK c4b0c08f7c Tree-SHA512: 95d5c92998b8b1e944c477dbaee265b62612b6e815099ab31d9ff580b4dff777abaf7f326a284644709f918aa1510412d62310689b1250ef6e64de7b19ca9f71	5 years ago
Gregory Sanders	c4b0c08f7c	Update tx-size-small comment with relevant CVE disclosure	5 years ago
lucash-dev	0c62e3aa73	New regression testing for CVE-2018-17144, CVE-2012-2459, and CVE-2010-5137. ... CVE-2018-17144 and CVE-2012-2459 are only partially tested for regression. - CVE-2018-17144 is not tested for the inflation bug. - CVE-2012-2459 is only tested for the mutated block being rejected, not for the original block being accepted afterwards. This commit fixes that limitation. Also added functional test for CVE-2010-5137.	6 years ago
Wladimir J. van der Laan	d7d7d31506	Merge #15141: Rewrite DoS interface between validation and net_processing ... 0ff1c2a838 Separate reason for premature spends (coinbase/locktime) (Suhas Daftuar) 54470e767b Assert validation reasons are contextually correct (Suhas Daftuar) 2120c31521 [refactor] Update some comments in validation.cpp as we arent doing DoS there (Matt Corallo) 12dbdd7a41 [refactor] Drop unused state.DoS(), state.GetDoS(), state.CorruptionPossible() (Matt Corallo) aa502b88d1 scripted-diff: Remove DoS calls to CValidationState (Matt Corallo) 7721ad64f4 [refactor] Prep for scripted-diff by removing some \ns which annoy sed. (Matt Corallo) 5e78c5734b Allow use of state.Invalid() for all reasons (Matt Corallo) 6b34bc6b6f Fix handling of invalid headers (Suhas Daftuar) ef54b486d5 [refactor] Use Reasons directly instead of DoS codes (Matt Corallo) 9ab2a0412e CorruptionPossible -> BLOCK_MUTATED (Matt Corallo) 6e55b292b0 CorruptionPossible -> TX_WITNESS_MUTATED (Matt Corallo) 7df16e70e6 LookupBlockIndex -> CACHED_INVALID (Matt Corallo) c8b0d22698 [refactor] Drop redundant nDoS, corruptionPossible, SetCorruptionPossible (Matt Corallo) 34477ccd39 [refactor] Add useful-for-dos "reason" field to CValidationState (Matt Corallo) 6a7f8777a0 Ban all peers for all block script failures (Suhas Daftuar) 7b999103e2 Clean up banning levels (Matt Corallo) b8b4c80146 [refactor] drop IsInvalid(nDoSOut) (Matt Corallo) 8818729013 [refactor] Refactor misbehavior ban decisions to MaybePunishNode() (Matt Corallo) 00e11e61c0 [refactor] rename stateDummy -> orphan_state (Matt Corallo) f34fa719cf Drop obsolete sigops comment (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: This is a rebase of #11639 with some fixes for the last few comments which were not yet addressed. The original PR text, with some strikethroughs of text that is no longer correct: > This cleans up an old main-carryover - it made sense that main could decide what DoS scores to assign things because the DoS scores were handled in a different part of main, but now validation is telling net_processing what DoS scores to assign to different things, which is utter nonsense. Instead, we replace CValidationState's nDoS and CorruptionPossible with a general ValidationInvalidReason, which net_processing can handle as it sees fit. I keep the behavior changes here to a minimum, but in the future we can utilize these changes for other smarter behavior, such as disconnecting/preferring to rotate outbound peers based on them providing things which are invalid due to SOFT_FORK because we shouldn't ban for such cases. > > This is somewhat complementary with, though obviously conflicts heavily with #11523, which added enums in place of DoS scores, as well as a few other cleanups (which are still relevant). > > Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made: > > Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS > points to 100. > Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban > instead of 10 DoS points. > ~~BIP68-violation no longer results in a ban as it is SOFT_FORK.~~ > ~~Non-SegWit SigOp violation no longer results in a ban as it > considers P2SH sigops and is thus SOFT_FORK.~~ > ~~Any script violation in a block no longer results in a ban as > it may be the result of a SOFT_FORK. This should likely be > fixed in the future by differentiating between them.~~ > Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban. > Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks > too far in the future continue to not result in a ban. > Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a > ban instead of 10 DoS points. Note: The change to ban all peers for consensus violations is actually NOT the change I'd like to make -- I'd prefer to only ban outbound peers in those situations. The current behavior is a bit of a mess, however, and so in the interests of advancing this PR I tried to keep the changes to a minimum. I plan to revisit the behavior in a followup PR. EDIT: One reviewer suggested I add some additional context for this PR: > The goal of this work was to make net_processing aware of the actual reasons for validation failures, rather than just deal with opaque numbers instructing it to do something. > > In the future, I'd like to make it so that we use more context to decide how to punish a peer. One example is to differentiate inbound and outbound peer misbehaviors. Another potential example is if we'd treat RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE failures differently (ie after the next consensus change is implemented), and perhaps again we'd want to treat some peers differently than others. ACKs for commit 0ff1c2: jnewbery: utACK 0ff1c2a838 ryanofsky: utACK 0ff1c2a838. Only change is dropping the first commit (f3883a321bf4ab289edcd9754b12cae3a648b175), and dropping the temporary `assert(level == GetDoS())` that was in 35ee77f2832eaffce30042e00785c310c5540cdc (now c8b0d22698) Tree-SHA512: e915a411100876398af5463d0a885920e44d473467bb6af991ef2e8f2681db6c1209bb60f848bd154be72d460f039b5653df20a6840352c5f7ea5486d9f777a3	6 years ago
Matt Corallo	7b999103e2	Clean up banning levels ... Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made: * Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS points to 100. * Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban instead of 10 DoS points. * Many pre-segwit soft-fork errors now result in a ban. Note: Transactions that violate soft-fork script flags since P2SH do not generally result in a ban. Also, banning behavior for invalid blocks is dependent on whether the node is validating with multiple script check threads, due to a long- standing bug. That inconsistency is still present after this commit. * Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban. * Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks too far in the future continue to *not* result in a ban. * Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a ban instead of 10 DoS points. Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>	6 years ago
Gregory Sanders	25b0786581	Fix missing input template by making minimal tx	6 years ago
James O'Beirne	59e387705c	test: add invalid tx templates for use in functional tests ... Add templates for easily constructing different kinds of invalid transactions and use them in feature_block and p2p_invalid_tx.	6 years ago