The previous diff touched most files in ./test/, so bump the headers to
avoid having to touch them again for a bump later.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./test/
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
While limitations on the influence of attackers on addrman already
exist (affected buckets are restricted to a subset based on incoming
IP / network group), there is no reason to permit them to let them
feed us addresses at more than a multiple of the normal network
rate.
This commit introduces a "token bucket" rate limiter for the
processing of addresses in incoming ADDR and ADDRV2 messages.
Every connection gets an associated token bucket. Processing an
address in an ADDR or ADDRV2 message from non-whitelisted peers
consumes a token from the bucket. If the bucket is empty, the
address is ignored (it is not forwarded or processed). The token
counter increases at a rate of 0.1 tokens per second, and will
accrue up to a maximum of 1000 tokens (the maximum we accept in a
single ADDR or ADDRV2). When a GETADDR is sent to a peer, it
immediately gets 1000 additional tokens, as we actively desire many
addresses from such peers (this may temporarily cause the token
count to exceed 1000).
The rate limit of 0.1 addr/s was chosen based on observation of
honest nodes on the network. Activity in general from most nodes
is either 0, or up to a maximum around 0.025 addr/s for recent
Bitcoin Core nodes. A few (self-identified, through subver) crawler
nodes occasionally exceed 0.1 addr/s.
- Use `SanitizeString` when logging message errors to make sure that the
message type is sanitized.
- For the `MESSAGESTART` error don't inspect and log header details at
all: receiving invalid start bytes makes it likely that the packet isn't
even formatted as valid P2P message. Logging the four unexpected start
bytes should be enough.
- Update `p2p_invalid_messages.py` test to check this.
Issue reported by gmaxwell.
Sending a version message after the intial version message is peer
misbehavior. Though, it seems arbitrary and confusing to disconnect only
after exactly 100 version messages. Duplicate version messages affect us
no different than any other unknown message. So remove the Misbehaving
and ignore the redundant msgs.
Introduce a new message `sendaddrv2` to signal support for ADDRv2.
Send the new message immediately after sending the `VERACK` message.
Add support for receiving and parsing ADDRv2 messages.
Send ADDRv2 messages (instead of ADDR) to a peer if he has
advertised support for it.
Co-authored-by: Carl Dong <contact@carldong.me>
deb52711a1 Remove header checks out of net_processing (Troy Giorshev)
52d4ae46ab Give V1TransportDeserializer CChainParams& member (Troy Giorshev)
5bceef6b12 Change CMessageHeader Constructor (Troy Giorshev)
1ca20c1af8 Add doxygen comment for ReceiveMsgBytes (Troy Giorshev)
890b1d7c2b Move checksum check from net_processing to net (Troy Giorshev)
2716647ebf Give V1TransportDeserializer an m_node_id member (Troy Giorshev)
Pull request description:
Inspired by #15206 and #15197, this PR moves all message header verification from the message processing layer and into the network/transport layer.
In the previous PRs there is a change in behavior, where we would disconnect from peers upon a single failed checksum check. In various discussions there was concern over whether this was the right choice, and some expressed a desire to see how this would look if it was made to be a pure refactor.
For more context, see https://bitcoincore.reviews/15206.html#l-81.
This PR improves the separation between the p2p layers, helping improvements like [BIP324](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18242) and #18989.
ACKs for top commit:
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK deb52711a1 just rebase due to conflict on adjacent line
jnewbery:
Code review ACK deb52711a1.
Tree-SHA512: 1a3b7ae883b020cfee1bef968813e04df651ffdad9dd961a826bd80654f2c98676ce7f4721038a1b78d8790e4cebe8060419e3d8affc97ce2b9b4e4b72e6fa9f
This moves header size and netmagic checking out of net_processing and
into net. This check now runs in ReadHeader, so that net can exit early
out of receiving bytes from the peer. IsValid is now slimmed down, so
it no longer needs a MessageStartChars& parameter.
Additionally this removes the rest of the m_valid_* members from
CNetMessage.
- call disconnect_p2ps() outside of the assert_debug_log scopes
- send messages directly from the p2p conn rather than via nodes[0].p2p
- add an assertion
A message can be broken across two buffers, with the split inside its
header. Usually this will occur when sending many messages, such that
the first buffer fills.
This test uses the RPC to verify that the message is actually being
received in two pieces.
There is a very rare chance of a race condition where the test framework
sends a message in between the two halves of the message under test. In
this case the peer will almost certainly disconnect and the test will
fail. An assert has been added to help debugging that rare case.
This is a simple refactor of the specified test. It is now brought in
line with the rest of the tests in the module. This should make things
easier to debug, as all of the tests are now grouped together at the
top.
This test originally made a message with an invalid stated length, and
an invalid checksum. This was because only the header was changed, but
the checksum stayed the same. This was fine for now because we check
the header first to see if it has a valid stated size, and we disconnect
if it does not, so we never end up checking for the checksum. If this
behavior was to change, this test would become a problem. (Indeed I
discovered this when playing around with this behavior). By instead
creating a message with an oversized payload from the start, we create a
message with an invalid stated length but a valid checksum, as intended.
Additionally, this takes advantage to the newly module-global
VALID_DATA_LIMIT as opposed to the magic 0x02000000. Yes, 4MB < 32MiB,
but at the moment when receiving a message we check both, so this makes
the test tighter.
As well, this renames those variables to match PEP8 and this clears up
the comment relating to VALID_DATA_LIMIT.
Admittedly, this commit is mainly to make the following ones cleaner.
Test 1 is a duplicate of test_size() later in the file. Inexplicably,
this test does not work on macOS, whereas test_size() does.
Test 2 is problematic for two reasons. First, it always fails with an
invalid checksum, which is probably not what was intended. Second, it's
not defined at this layer what the behavior should be. Hypothetically,
if this test was fixed so that it gave messages with valid checksums,
then the message would pass successfully thought the network layer and
fail only in the processing layer. A priori the network layer has no
idea what the size of a message "actually" is.
The "Why does behavior change at 78 bytes" is because of the following:
print(len(node.p2p.build_message(msg))) # 125
=> Payload size = 125 - 24 = 101
If we take 77 bytes, then there are 101 - 77 = 24 left
That's exactly the size of a header
So, bitcoind deserializes the header and rejects it for some other reason
(Almost always an invalid size (too large))
But, if we take 78 bytes, then there are 101 - 78 = 23 left
That's not enough to fill a header, so the socket stays open waiting for
more data. That's why we sometimes have to push additional data in
order for the peer to disconnect.
Additionally, both of these tests use the "conn" variable. For fun, go
look at where it's declared. (Hint: test_large_inv(). Don't we all
love python's idea of scope?)
9df32e820d scripted-diff: test: replace command with msgtype (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This is a follow-up PR to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18533, which changed the naming of `strCommand` to `msg_type` in the network processing code. The same approach is done here for the function test framework, to get rid of the wrong "command" terminology for network mesage types. (Commands are usually used in the CLI or RPC context, so using the same name in the network message context would only be confusing.)
The commit was created through the following steps:
1. search for all occurences of the string "command" within the folder `test/functional`
```git grep -i command test/functional > command_finds```
2. manually sort out all false-positives, i.e. occurences of "command" which describe commands in the correct sense (mostly CLI or RPC related, also some with Socks5)
3. put the remaining occurences into a scripted-diff (a quite simple one, actually) that renames "command" to "msgtype" in the concerned files.
The name `msgtype` was intentionally chosen without the underscore `_` as classes beginning with `msg_` define concrete types of messages.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK 9df32e820d . Makes sense that tests use the same naming as Bitcoin Core. See `NetMsgType` here: https://doxygen.bitcoincore.org/namespace_net_msg_type.html
Tree-SHA512: cd0ee08a382910b7f10ce583acdaf4f8a39f9ba4a22434a914415727eedd98bac538de9bf6633574d5eb86f62558bc8dcb638a3289d99b04f8481f34e7a9a0c7
This is the functional test framework pendant for
7777e3624f, which renamed "strCommand" with
"msg_type" in the network processing code.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
# Rename in test framework
sed -i 's/command/msgtype/g' ./test/functional/test_framework/messages.py ./test/functional/test_framework/mininode.py
# Rename in individual tests
sed -i 's/command/msgtype/g' ./test/functional/p2p_invalid_messages.py ./test/functional/p2p_leak.py
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
2d23082cbe bump test timeouts so that functional tests run in valgrind (Micky Yun Chan)
Pull request description:
ci/tests: Bump timeouts so all functional tests run on travis in valgrind #17763
Top commit has no ACKs.
Tree-SHA512: 5a8c6e2ea02b715facfcb58c761577be15ae58c45a61654beb98c2c2653361196c2eec521bcae4a9a1bab8e409d6807de771ef4c46d3d05996ae47a22d499d54
Builds on travis are failing because the test node isn't
able to drop all the bad messages sent within the given
timeout. Reduce the number of bad messages we're sending
and increase the timeout to avoid failures on travis.
MarcoFalke