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@ -2516,6 +2516,65 @@ bool CWallet::FundTransaction(CMutableTransaction& tx, CAmount& nFeeRet, int& nC
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return true;
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}
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static bool IsCurrentForAntiFeeSniping(interfaces::Chain::Lock& locked_chain)
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{
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if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
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return false;
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}
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constexpr int64_t MAX_ANTI_FEE_SNIPING_TIP_AGE = 8 * 60 * 60; // in seconds
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if (chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockTime() < (GetTime() - MAX_ANTI_FEE_SNIPING_TIP_AGE)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Return a height-based locktime for new transactions (uses the height of the
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* current chain tip unless we are not synced with the current chain
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*/
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static uint32_t GetLocktimeForNewTransaction(interfaces::Chain::Lock& locked_chain)
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{
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uint32_t locktime;
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// Discourage fee sniping.
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//
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// For a large miner the value of the transactions in the best block and
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// the mempool can exceed the cost of deliberately attempting to mine two
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// blocks to orphan the current best block. By setting nLockTime such that
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// only the next block can include the transaction, we discourage this
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// practice as the height restricted and limited blocksize gives miners
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// considering fee sniping fewer options for pulling off this attack.
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//
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// A simple way to think about this is from the wallet's point of view we
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// always want the blockchain to move forward. By setting nLockTime this
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// way we're basically making the statement that we only want this
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// transaction to appear in the next block; we don't want to potentially
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// encourage reorgs by allowing transactions to appear at lower heights
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// than the next block in forks of the best chain.
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//
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// Of course, the subsidy is high enough, and transaction volume low
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// enough, that fee sniping isn't a problem yet, but by implementing a fix
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// now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about
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// nLockTime that preclude a fix later.
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if (IsCurrentForAntiFeeSniping(locked_chain)) {
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locktime = chainActive.Height();
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// Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so
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// that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason,
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// e.g. high-latency mix networks and some CoinJoin implementations, have
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// better privacy.
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if (GetRandInt(10) == 0)
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locktime = std::max(0, (int)locktime - GetRandInt(100));
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} else {
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// If our chain is lagging behind, we can't discourage fee sniping nor help
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// the privacy of high-latency transactions. To avoid leaking a potentially
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// unique "nLockTime fingerprint", set nLockTime to a constant.
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locktime = 0;
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}
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assert(locktime <= (unsigned int)chainActive.Height());
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assert(locktime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD);
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return locktime;
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}
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OutputType CWallet::TransactionChangeType(OutputType change_type, const std::vector<CRecipient>& vecSend)
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{
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// If -changetype is specified, always use that change type.
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@ -2570,37 +2629,8 @@ bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(interfaces::Chain::Lock& locked_chain, const std
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CMutableTransaction txNew;
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// Discourage fee sniping.
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//
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// For a large miner the value of the transactions in the best block and
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// the mempool can exceed the cost of deliberately attempting to mine two
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|
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// blocks to orphan the current best block. By setting nLockTime such that
|
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|
|
|
// only the next block can include the transaction, we discourage this
|
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|
|
|
// practice as the height restricted and limited blocksize gives miners
|
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|
|
|
// considering fee sniping fewer options for pulling off this attack.
|
|
|
|
|
//
|
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|
|
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// A simple way to think about this is from the wallet's point of view we
|
|
|
|
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// always want the blockchain to move forward. By setting nLockTime this
|
|
|
|
|
// way we're basically making the statement that we only want this
|
|
|
|
|
// transaction to appear in the next block; we don't want to potentially
|
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|
|
|
// encourage reorgs by allowing transactions to appear at lower heights
|
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|
|
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// than the next block in forks of the best chain.
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//
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// Of course, the subsidy is high enough, and transaction volume low
|
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// enough, that fee sniping isn't a problem yet, but by implementing a fix
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|
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// now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about
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// nLockTime that preclude a fix later.
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txNew.nLockTime = chainActive.Height();
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// Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so
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// that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason,
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|
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// e.g. high-latency mix networks and some CoinJoin implementations, have
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// better privacy.
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if (GetRandInt(10) == 0)
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txNew.nLockTime = std::max(0, (int)txNew.nLockTime - GetRandInt(100));
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txNew.nLockTime = GetLocktimeForNewTransaction(locked_chain);
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assert(txNew.nLockTime <= (unsigned int)chainActive.Height());
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assert(txNew.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD);
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FeeCalculation feeCalc;
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CAmount nFeeNeeded;
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int nBytes;
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