Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#23536: Enforce Taproot script flags whenever WITNESS is set

cccc1e70b8 Enforce Taproot script flags whenever WITNESS is set (MarcoFalke)
fa42299411 Remove nullptr check in GetBlockScriptFlags (MarcoFalke)
faadc606c7 refactor: Pass const reference instead of pointer to GetBlockScriptFlags (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

  Now that Taproot is active, it makes sense to enforce its rules on all blocks, even historic ones, regardless of the deployment status.

  ### Benefits:

  (With "script flags" I mean "taproot script verification flags".)

  * Script flags are known ahead for all blocks (even blocks not yet created) and do not change. This may benefit static analysis, code review, and development of new script features that build on Taproot.
  * Any future bugs introduced in the deployment code won't have any effect on the script flags, as they are independent of deployment.
  * Enforcing the taproot rules regardless of the deployment status makes testing easier because invalid blocks after activation are also invalid before activation. So there is no need to differentiate the two cases.
  * It gives belt-and-suspenders protection against a practically expensive and theoretically impossible IBD reorg attack where the node is eclipsed. While `nMinimumChainWork` already protects against this, the cost for a few months worth of POW might be lowered until a major version release of Bitcoin Core reaches EOL. The needed work for the attack is the difference between `nMinimumChainWork` and the work at block 709632.

  For reference, previously the same was done for P2SH and WITNESS in commit 0a8b7b4b33.

  ### Implementation:

  I found one block which fails verification with the flags applied, so I added a `TaprootException`, similar to the `BIP16Exception`.

  For reference, the debug log:

  ```
  ERROR: ConnectBlock(): CheckInputScripts on b10c007c60e14f9d087e0291d4d0c7869697c6681d979c6639dbd960792b4d41 failed with non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (Witness program was passed an empty witness)
  BlockChecked: block hash=0000000000000000000f14c35b2d841e986ab5441de8c585d5ffe55ea1e395ad state=non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (Witness program was passed an empty witness)
  InvalidChainFound: invalid block=0000000000000000000f14c35b2d841e986ab5441de8c585d5ffe55ea1e395ad  height=692261  log2_work=92.988459  date=2021-07-23T08:24:20Z
  InvalidChainFound:  current best=0000000000000000000067b17a4c0ffd77c29941b15ad356ca8f980af137a25d  height=692260  log2_work=92.988450  date=2021-07-23T07:47:31Z
  ERROR: ConnectTip: ConnectBlock 0000000000000000000f14c35b2d841e986ab5441de8c585d5ffe55ea1e395ad failed, non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (Witness program was passed an empty witness)
  ```

  Hint for testing, make sure to set `-noassumevalid`.

  ### Considerations

  Obviously this change can lead to consensus splits on the network in light of massive reorgs. Currently the last block before Taproot activation, that is the last block without the Taproot script flags set, is only buried by a few days of POW. However, when and if this patch is included in the next major release, it will be buried by a few months of POW. BIP90 considerations apply when looking at reorgs this large.

ACKs for top commit:
  Sjors:
    tACK cccc1e70b8
  achow101:
    ACK cccc1e70b8
  laanwj:
    Code review ACK cccc1e70b8
  ajtowns:
    ACK cccc1e70b8 ; code review; wrote a "getblockscriptflags" rpc to quickly check that blocks just had bit 17 (taproot) added; review of earlier revisions had established non-exception blocks do validate with taproot rules enabled.
  jamesob:
    ACK cccc1e70b8 ([`jamesob/ackr/23536.1.MarcoFalke.enforce_taproot_script_f`](https://github.com/jamesob/bitcoin/tree/ackr/23536.1.MarcoFalke.enforce_taproot_script_f))

Tree-SHA512: 00044de68939caef6420ffd588c1291c041a8b397c80a3df1e3e3487fbeae1821d23975c51c95e44e774558db76f943b00b4e27cbd0213f64a9253116dc6edde
pull/24672/head
laanwj 3 years ago
commit 7c08d81e11
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 1E4AED62986CD25D

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <consensus/merkle.h>
#include <deploymentinfo.h>
#include <hash.h> // for signet block challenge hash
#include <script/interpreter.h>
#include <util/system.h>
#include <assert.h>
@ -65,7 +66,10 @@ public:
consensus.signet_blocks = false;
consensus.signet_challenge.clear();
consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 210000;
consensus.BIP16Exception = uint256S("0x00000000000002dc756eebf4f49723ed8d30cc28a5f108eb94b1ba88ac4f9c22");
consensus.script_flag_exceptions.emplace( // BIP16 exception
uint256S("0x00000000000002dc756eebf4f49723ed8d30cc28a5f108eb94b1ba88ac4f9c22"), SCRIPT_VERIFY_NONE);
consensus.script_flag_exceptions.emplace( // Taproot exception
uint256S("0x0000000000000000000f14c35b2d841e986ab5441de8c585d5ffe55ea1e395ad"), SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS);
consensus.BIP34Height = 227931;
consensus.BIP34Hash = uint256S("0x000000000000024b89b42a942fe0d9fea3bb44ab7bd1b19115dd6a759c0808b8");
consensus.BIP65Height = 388381; // 000000000000000004c2b624ed5d7756c508d90fd0da2c7c679febfa6c4735f0
@ -184,7 +188,8 @@ public:
consensus.signet_blocks = false;
consensus.signet_challenge.clear();
consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 210000;
consensus.BIP16Exception = uint256S("0x00000000dd30457c001f4095d208cc1296b0eed002427aa599874af7a432b105");
consensus.script_flag_exceptions.emplace( // BIP16 exception
uint256S("0x00000000dd30457c001f4095d208cc1296b0eed002427aa599874af7a432b105"), SCRIPT_VERIFY_NONE);
consensus.BIP34Height = 21111;
consensus.BIP34Hash = uint256S("0x0000000023b3a96d3484e5abb3755c413e7d41500f8e2a5c3f0dd01299cd8ef8");
consensus.BIP65Height = 581885; // 00000000007f6655f22f98e72ed80d8b06dc761d5da09df0fa1dc4be4f861eb6
@ -323,7 +328,6 @@ public:
consensus.signet_blocks = true;
consensus.signet_challenge.assign(bin.begin(), bin.end());
consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 210000;
consensus.BIP16Exception = uint256{};
consensus.BIP34Height = 1;
consensus.BIP34Hash = uint256{};
consensus.BIP65Height = 1;
@ -391,7 +395,6 @@ public:
consensus.signet_blocks = false;
consensus.signet_challenge.clear();
consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 150;
consensus.BIP16Exception = uint256();
consensus.BIP34Height = 1; // Always active unless overridden
consensus.BIP34Hash = uint256();
consensus.BIP65Height = 1; // Always active unless overridden

@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
#define BITCOIN_CONSENSUS_PARAMS_H
#include <uint256.h>
#include <limits>
#include <map>
namespace Consensus {
@ -70,8 +72,13 @@ struct BIP9Deployment {
struct Params {
uint256 hashGenesisBlock;
int nSubsidyHalvingInterval;
/* Block hash that is excepted from BIP16 enforcement */
uint256 BIP16Exception;
/**
* Hashes of blocks that
* - are known to be consensus valid, and
* - buried in the chain, and
* - fail if the default script verify flags are applied.
*/
std::map<uint256, uint32_t> script_flag_exceptions;
/** Block height and hash at which BIP34 becomes active */
int BIP34Height;
uint256 BIP34Hash;

@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ bool CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(CBlockIndex* tip,
}
// Returns the script flags which should be checked for a given block
static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Params& chainparams);
static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex& block_index, const Consensus::Params& chainparams);
static void LimitMempoolSize(CTxMemPool& pool, CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache, size_t limit, std::chrono::seconds age)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, pool.cs)
@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating
// invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such
// transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack.
unsigned int currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags = GetBlockScriptFlags(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), chainparams.GetConsensus());
unsigned int currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), chainparams.GetConsensus())};
if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(tx, state, m_view, m_pool, currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags,
ws.m_precomputed_txdata, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip())) {
LogPrintf("BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputScripts failed against latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s\n", hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
@ -1854,45 +1854,39 @@ public:
static ThresholdConditionCache warningcache[VERSIONBITS_NUM_BITS] GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Params& consensusparams)
static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex& block_index, const Consensus::Params& consensusparams)
{
unsigned int flags = SCRIPT_VERIFY_NONE;
// BIP16 didn't become active until Apr 1 2012 (on mainnet, and
// retroactively applied to testnet)
// However, only one historical block violated the P2SH rules (on both
// mainnet and testnet), so for simplicity, always leave P2SH
// on except for the one violating block.
if (consensusparams.BIP16Exception.IsNull() || // no bip16 exception on this chain
pindex->phashBlock == nullptr || // this is a new candidate block, eg from TestBlockValidity()
*pindex->phashBlock != consensusparams.BIP16Exception) // this block isn't the historical exception
{
// Enforce WITNESS rules whenever P2SH is in effect
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS;
// mainnet and testnet).
// Similarly, only one historical block violated the TAPROOT rules on
// mainnet.
// For simplicity, always leave P2SH+WITNESS+TAPROOT on except for the two
// violating blocks.
uint32_t flags{SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_TAPROOT};
const auto it{consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.find(*Assert(block_index.phashBlock))};
if (it != consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.end()) {
flags = it->second;
}
// Enforce the DERSIG (BIP66) rule
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) {
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG;
}
// Enforce CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (BIP65)
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV)) {
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY;
}
// Enforce CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112)
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY;
}
// Enforce Taproot (BIP340-BIP342)
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_TAPROOT)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_TAPROOT;
}
// Enforce BIP147 NULLDUMMY (activated simultaneously with segwit)
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, consensusparams, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_NULLDUMMY;
}
@ -1900,7 +1894,6 @@ static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consens
}
static int64_t nTimeCheck = 0;
static int64_t nTimeForks = 0;
static int64_t nTimeVerify = 0;
@ -2088,7 +2081,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
}
// Get the script flags for this block
unsigned int flags = GetBlockScriptFlags(pindex, m_params.GetConsensus());
unsigned int flags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*pindex, m_params.GetConsensus())};
int64_t nTime2 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeForks += nTime2 - nTime1;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Fork checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", MILLI * (nTime2 - nTime1), nTimeForks * MICRO, nTimeForks * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);

@ -1182,15 +1182,11 @@ def spenders_taproot_inactive():
]
tap = taproot_construct(pub, scripts)
# Test that keypath spending is valid & non-standard, regardless of validity.
# Test that valid spending is standard.
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/keypath_valid", key=sec, tap=tap, standard=Standard.V23)
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/keypath_invalidsig", key=sec, tap=tap, standard=False, sighash=bitflipper(default_sighash))
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/keypath_empty", key=sec, tap=tap, standard=False, witness=[])
# Same for scriptpath spending (and features like annex, leaf versions, or OP_SUCCESS don't change this)
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_valid", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="pk", standard=Standard.V23, inputs=[getter("sign")])
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_invalidsig", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="pk", standard=False, inputs=[getter("sign")], sighash=bitflipper(default_sighash))
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_invalidcb", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="pk", standard=False, inputs=[getter("sign")], controlblock=bitflipper(default_controlblock))
# Test that features like annex, leaf versions, or OP_SUCCESS are valid but non-standard
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_valid_unkleaf", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="future_leaf", standard=False, inputs=[getter("sign")])
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_invalid_unkleaf", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="future_leaf", standard=False, inputs=[getter("sign")], sighash=bitflipper(default_sighash))
add_spender(spenders, "inactive/scriptpath_valid_opsuccess", key=sec, tap=tap, leaf="op_success", standard=False, inputs=[getter("sign")])

Loading…
Cancel
Save