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// Copyright (c) 2009-2011 Satoshi Nakamoto & Bitcoin developers
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// Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
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// file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#ifndef BITCOIN_KEYSTORE_H
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#define BITCOIN_KEYSTORE_H
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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#include "crypter.h"
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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class CKeyStore
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{
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public:
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mutable CCriticalSection cs_KeyStore;
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virtual bool AddKey(const CKey& key) =0;
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virtual bool HaveKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address) const =0;
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virtual bool GetKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address, CKey& keyOut) const =0;
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virtual bool GetPubKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchPubKeyOut) const;
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virtual std::vector<unsigned char> GenerateNewKey();
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};
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typedef std::map<CBitcoinAddress, CSecret> KeyMap;
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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class CBasicKeyStore : public CKeyStore
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{
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protected:
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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KeyMap mapKeys;
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public:
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bool AddKey(const CKey& key);
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bool HaveKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address) const
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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{
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return (mapKeys.count(address) > 0);
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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}
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bool GetKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address, CKey& keyOut) const
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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{
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KeyMap::const_iterator mi = mapKeys.find(address);
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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if (mi != mapKeys.end())
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{
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keyOut.SetSecret((*mi).second);
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
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}
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};
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typedef std::map<CBitcoinAddress, std::pair<std::vector<unsigned char>, std::vector<unsigned char> > > CryptedKeyMap;
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class CCryptoKeyStore : public CBasicKeyStore
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{
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private:
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CryptedKeyMap mapCryptedKeys;
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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CKeyingMaterial vMasterKey;
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// if fUseCrypto is true, mapKeys must be empty
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// if fUseCrypto is false, vMasterKey must be empty
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bool fUseCrypto;
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protected:
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bool SetCrypted()
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{
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if (fUseCrypto)
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return true;
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if (!mapKeys.empty())
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return false;
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fUseCrypto = true;
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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return true;
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}
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// will encrypt previously unencrypted keys
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
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bool EncryptKeys(CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKeyIn);
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Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
|
|
|
bool Unlock(const CKeyingMaterial& vMasterKeyIn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
public:
|
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
|
|
|
mutable CCriticalSection cs_vMasterKey; //No guarantees master key wont get locked before you can use it, so lock this first
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|
CCryptoKeyStore() : fUseCrypto(false)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
|
|
|
bool IsCrypted() const
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|
{
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return fUseCrypto;
|
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|
}
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bool IsLocked() const
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|
{
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if (!IsCrypted())
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return false;
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return vMasterKey.empty();
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|
}
|
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|
|
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bool Lock()
|
|
|
|
{
|
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
|
|
|
CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_vMasterKey)
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{
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if (!SetCrypted())
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return false;
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vMasterKey.clear();
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}
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return true;
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}
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virtual bool AddCryptedKey(const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret);
|
Add wallet privkey encryption.
This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet.
All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase
is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses.
Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is
calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and
a random salt.
By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC
command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options->
Encrypt Wallet.
When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password
to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call
walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first.
A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool
(requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first).
keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the
number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call
keypoolrefill).
Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate
thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some
delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including
one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected,
however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as
ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon
as the specified lock time has arrived.
When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool
returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to
vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time.
A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to
allow the user to change their password via RPC.
Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase,
the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt
is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material.
This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the
memory is not possible.
Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop
systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an
RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main
advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend
coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives
payment except for cases of manual intervention.
Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others
for all their input.
Conflicts:
src/wallet.cpp
14 years ago
|
|
|
std::vector<unsigned char> GenerateNewKey();
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|
|
bool AddKey(const CKey& key);
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|
bool HaveKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address) const
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|
{
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if (!IsCrypted())
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return CBasicKeyStore::HaveKey(address);
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return mapCryptedKeys.count(address) > 0;
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|
}
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bool GetKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address, CKey& keyOut) const;
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bool GetPubKey(const CBitcoinAddress &address, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchPubKeyOut) const;
|
CWallet class
* A new class CKeyStore manages private keys, and script.cpp depends on access to CKeyStore.
* A new class CWallet extends CKeyStore, and contains all former wallet-specific globals; CWallet depends on script.cpp, not the other way around.
* Wallet-specific functions in CTransaction/CTxIn/CTxOut (GetDebit, GetCredit, GetChange, IsMine, IsFromMe), are moved to CWallet, taking their former 'this' argument as an explicit parameter
* CWalletTx objects know which CWallet they belong to, for convenience, so they have their own direct (and caching) GetDebit/... functions.
* Some code was moved from CWalletDB to CWallet, such as handling of reserve keys.
* Main.cpp keeps a set of all 'registered' wallets, which should be informed about updates to the block chain, and does not have any notion about any 'main' wallet. Function in main.cpp that require a wallet (such as GenerateCoins), take an explicit CWallet* argument.
* The actual CWallet instance used by the application is defined in init.cpp as "CWallet* pwalletMain". rpc.cpp and ui.cpp use this variable.
* Functions in main.cpp and db.cpp that are not used by other modules are marked static.
* The code for handling the 'submitorder' message is removed, as it not really compatible with the idea that a node is independent from the wallet(s) connected to it, and obsolete anyway.
14 years ago
|
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|
};
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#endif
|